



## Partnership with national institutions

30

- **Close and efficient cooperation** beneficiaries: BG, Customs Service, DCA, and PhytoVet/Sanitary Epidemiological services, Interior Ministry, Migration Service on programme related issues;
- Donor coordination is very **effective** thanks to Border International Group (BIG) and its Sub-group monthly meetings. BOMCA provides secretariat functions. Permanent members: USA, EUD, Russian Fed, Japan, OSCE, UNDP, IOM, UNHCR, DRC, UNODC.
- **CABSI** – Central Asian Border Security Initiative



# Potential areas for coordination and partnership:



31

- ✓ BOMCA seeks to align its capacity building interventions with the work of regional institutions

Potential partners - CARICC, CIS Council of Border Guards, World Customs Organization for Trade and Transit, Central Asian Regional Economic Cooperation (CAREC)

- ✓ BOMCA seeks to align border management goals and activities with on-going policies and programming in poverty reduction, good governance, and other areas of sustainable development

Potential partners – US programmes, OSCE projects, IOM, UNODC, UNHCR

- ✓ BOMCA seeks to enhance the opportunities for stimulating trade and transit

Potential partners - EUBAM, BOMBEL, SCIBM, BOMNAF.


- ✓ BOMCA seeks to enhance community based border development, through **socio-economic activities** in conflict zones and serve as a mechanism for dialogue, joint problem-solving and cooperation across borders.

Potential partners – UNHCR, UNDP, UNODC

6 4 2 8







# **EUROPEAN UNION BORDER MANAGEMENT, NORTHERN AFGHANISTAN (EU-BOMNAF)**

**Presentation by  
William Lawrence  
Project Manager**





# PROJECT OUTCOME




Integrated border management, cross-border and regional issues are better managed by building capacity and improved cooperation among local, national and international partners.







# INFLUENCE ON DEVELOPMENT





# International Border Crossing Points at Tajik-Afghan Border: Donors



1. Shirkhan Bandar (AFG) – Nizhni Pyanj (TJK)
2. Khohon (AFG) – Shogun (Shurabad, TJK)
3. Nusai (AFG) - Ruzvai (Darvaz, TJK)
4. Djomariji Bolo (AFG) – Khumrogi (Vanj, TJK)
5. Shegnan (AFG) – Tem (Khorog, TJK)
6. Eshkashem (AFG) - Ishkashim (TJK)
7. Ai Khanoum Border Crossing Point (AFG) by Japan





# UNITED NATIONS SECURITY ADVISORY



**From:**

UNDSS Joint Operations Centre (JOC)

**Incident type:**

Assassination, abduction & intimidation

**Location:**

Northern Afghanistan

**Date/Time:**


April 2013

**Information:**

Assassinations, abductions and intimidations of the local population continue. Assassinations increased from eleven to twenty three individuals assassinated in NER, NR, SER & ER












# TRAINING



- Joint cooperation – EU-UNDP-OSCE
- Two-week training courses in Dushanbe
- 25 Officers each course
- Total 300 Afghan border officers.







# EQUIPMENT



- Modern equipment
- Training
- Electricity
- Maintenance







# BADAKHSHAN



- Badakhshan is a new source of instability.
- General increase in security incidents.
- Kabul govt has weak position in Badakhshan.
- Some areas run by warlords.
- Worsening situation caused by narcotics.
- Increasing Taliban influence.





# POST 2014...



- Growing uncertainty across the region.
- Afghan security forces now at 352,000.
- Presidential elections in 2014.
- Influences driven by national psychology.
- Taliban may attack N transit route.
- Iranian influences in East (esp Herat).







# ANY ANSWERS?

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**Valeriy Korotenko**

**Police Affairs Officer on counter illicit drugs**

**Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe**

Ladies and Gentlemen,

This is a good time to reaffirm our commitments towards the fight against illicit drugs, and to reinforce cooperation among countries and international organizations. In July 2012 the OSCE participating States adopted (PC DEC/1048) the *OSCE Concept for Combating the Threat of Illicit Drugs and the Diversion of Chemical Precursors*. With this mandate the OSCE Secretariat commits itself to using available resources, to raise awareness on the threat of illicit drugs and to enhance the capacities of law enforcement agencies to adequately respond with preventative and executive measures. This requires an OSCE-wide approach, coordination with the (UNODC) and other affiliated anti-drugs programs, to support national drug-fighting strategies and structures and to facilitate participating States in building trust and enabling information sharing within regional co-operation, as part of a broader international collaboration. This is essential in any strategic scenario against the transnational threats associated with illicit drugs.

The OSCE participating States are very much concerned about possible security implications after the planned withdrawal of international forces from Afghanistan in 2014.

In this regard on 12 March the Secretariat conducted Security Day which was held in Vienna. The event, entitled “*International Community Engagement with Afghanistan and Central Asian States – Challenges, Synergies, Possible Responses and the OSCE Role*”, helped to address the current trends and challenges facing the OSCE participating States in Central Asia and Afghanistan, particularly in light of the ongoing Afghan security and political transition. The event was attended by 285 participants, who took part in the discussions led by 23 expert panelists, representing





wide range of international, regional and sub-regional organizations, Central Asian and Afghan governments, academia, and OSCE experts from field missions, institutions and the Secretariat.

**It was underlined that, though the transition process in Afghanistan has so far brought some positive results, the situation remains fragile and reversible.**

Particular concern was expressed over the **capacity** of the Afghanistan National Security Forces (ANSF) to maintain stability following the withdrawal of ISAF troops. It was noted that the 2014 **Presidential elections** will present a test to Afghanistan's commitment to inclusive and democratic governance. Speakers also underlined the important role to be played by Afghanistan's **neighbors** in creating a new regional security paradigm. In addition, due attention should be paid to existing **challenges** within the wider Central Asia region, including those related to energy, water management, territorial and border disputes and interethnic relations, which present potential to further **undermine trust** among key regional actors.

Against this background, the International Community is determined to **remain engaged beyond 2014**, including with regard to promoting regional co-operation.

Speakers also noted the potential for further developing synergies among existing initiatives, including **the New Silk Road, the Heart of Asia**, and the activities of regional organizations such as the OSCE, CSTO, NATO, SCO, and EU, who can complement each other's work in the region. Other projects, including the TAPI pipeline, promised to bring economic development in the region, including direct benefits to Afghanistan.

Speakers also addressed the need for continued international support for strengthening border security and management, combating terrorism and drug trafficking and other emerging trans-national threats. It was suggested that the **OSCE Border Management Staff College could expand its activities in order to support these efforts**, which so far has trained 1138 border experts from 38 OSCE participating States and Partners, including 381 Afghan experts. A second project that





was discussed was the OSCE support for **cross border trade resource centers**, which provide **advice and consultations to merchants** along the Afghan-Tajik border. More than 2,100 traders have taken advantage of this service, which will be expanded into a 5th location in 2013.

It was a proposal to establish a Center of Excellence on Police Management (CEPMA) in the region, which would bring law enforcement experts from across Central Asia and Afghanistan together for practical training with an emphasis on the OSCE's cross-dimensional security approach, the sharing of experiences and networking. Following consultations with the Kazakh authorities, the center could be located in Almaty, Kazakhstan.

There was also a reference to the proposed creation of a **research center** on Afghanistan that could be hosted at the **OSCE Bishkek Academy**, which could **train Afghan officials and conduct research on current regional developments**.

The UN and the rest of the international community need to be seen **as supporting and not imposing** the transition process. The OSCE, through its presence throughout Central Asia, can play an important role as a platform for dialogue among a broad variety of stakeholders, including between the countries of the region and with experts from international, regional and sub-regional organizations.

The preparations for the 2014 Afghan presidential elections were discussed, including priority areas for the electoral reform put forward by ODIHR, which include the reform of the electoral legal framework; strengthening of compliance mechanisms; capacity building of the Independent Elections Commission; creation of a voter registry; establishment of electoral boundaries; strengthening effectiveness of political parties; and reinforcing capacities of domestic observers.

The tools for the Organization to co-ordinate future Afghanistan-related activities could be improved. In this regard, reference was made to a suggestion to create **an Afghanistan Focal Point** within executive structures of the **OSCE**.

The security situation in Afghanistan is directly linked to security across the region.





Support for ANSF, and in particular for police, border guards, counter-narcotics officers and counter-terrorism experts must be continued and efforts in this area should be coordinated among all international actors. **Overlap of activities of various international actors** should be **minimized**, however duplication of efforts is not always a negative factor since the need for capacity building is so great and there is room for multiple actors in the same area, as long as the efforts are closely coordinated with the leading organizations in the field.

These proposals and recommendations were sounded during that security day.

Some ongoing or future projects have not been mentioned and I can briefly to describe them to be aware of them.

1. Bilateral meetings
2. Domodedovo training
3. Drugs profile determination training
4. Juvenile police training
5. National Seminars

I would propose to participating States and Member States on voluntary basis to introduce at national police academies quotas for groups of law enforcement officers from Afghanistan with minimum training as of two years. In two years Afghanistan would get well educated to start with police reforms there. The Paris Pact ADAM website could serve as a co-ordination tool among countries involved in training.

Various drug demand reduction and drug supply reduction programs are being implemented with the support of the Secretariat and our 16 OSCE field missions, which are operating in Central Asia, Caucasus and South Eastern European countries. The OSCE and its field presences are well placed for a highly practical approach. All these prove that the OSCE truly has a comprehensive approach to security, offering co-operation in all dimensions.

Thank you for your attention.





## Final Report

Prepared by Lilian Darii  
for the UNRCCA

The seminar “Challenges in addressing the illicit drugs problem in the context of withdrawal of international forces from Afghanistan in 2014” was organized in Dushanbe, Tajikistan, by the United Nations Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy in Central Asia (UNRCCA), in co-operation with the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). The event brought together representatives of institute of strategic studies, academia, international and regional organizations and government bodies from the five Central Asian countries, Afghanistan, the Russian Federation and the United States. The main emphasis was on discussing and analyzing possible scenarios of developments in Afghanistan and their implications on the wider region after the ongoing withdrawal of international forces from Afghanistan, which is to be completed by 2014. The seminar was divided into five sessions, the conclusions and recommendations of which are presented below on the basis of the reports of the sessions' rapporteurs: Bakhit Abdildina, Nodir Khudayberganov, Jomart Ormonbekov and Alexander Tolstukhin.

### **Session 1: Overall security and geo-political dynamics in the region before and after 2014 and trends in illicit drug production and trafficking**

In the first session, participants deliberated on the links and interconnections between security and geo-political developments in Afghanistan and the wider region, as well as on trends in illicit drug production and trafficking. They also elaborated on the possible developments in the region after 2014 and the expectations of various regional and global actors.

The situation within Afghanistan has long influenced geopolitical and security developments in the region and even globally. Afghanistan is the world's largest producer of opium and heroin. For the past decade, the country has produced an estimated 90 per cent of the world's opium, which fuels local instability, affects regional security, stimulates transnational organized crime, increases local, regional and global drug consumption and contributes to the spread of HIV/AIDS. Much of the opium produced in Afghanistan is trafficked through adjacent countries and reaches markets in Western Europe and North America. However, transit countries are also increasingly witnessing a rise in the number of drug addicted persons.

Participants discussed at length trends in opium production and trafficking routes in the region and beyond. Highlights of the discussions included:

- **Statistical data can be problematic.** While cultivation has increased, the number of users has remained essentially stable. It is possible that production statistics are overestimated, and indeed **UNODC revised 2006-2009**





**production figures in 2013 such that total production decreased by 6,300 tons in those years (from 28,900 tons to 22,600). Similarly, statistics on the number of users provided by certain countries may also be underestimated, particularly in Africa and Asia. Other factors may also account for the discrepancy, including consumers' opting for other types of narcotics and a virtual absence of data on consumption of opiates (opium/heroin).**

- **The market is huge.** The global heroin and raw opium market had a total estimated value of USD 65.5 billion in 2010, of which Afghan opiates represented USD 46 billion.
- **There are two main heroin trafficking corridors linking producers in Afghanistan to markets in Russia and Western Europe.** The Balkan route traverses Iran (often via Pakistan), Turkey, Greece and Bulgaria across South-East Europe to the Western European market, with an annual market value of some \$20 billion. The “Northern” route runs mainly through Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan (or Uzbekistan or Turkmenistan) to Kazakhstan and Russia. The size of that market is estimated to total USD 13 billion per year.
- **The bulk of Afghan opiates are consumed in Iran, Pakistan and the Central Asian countries.** Western Europe, however, remains the most lucrative market for heroin.
- Despite the issues with statistics mentioned above, the most recent estimates by UNODC nevertheless show that **opium production in Afghanistan has witnessed an alarming increase.** Southern, western, north-eastern and eastern regions in Afghanistan all have seen an increase in the levels of poppy cultivation. There are indications that the Northern provinces may soon lose their “opium-free” status. Despite the presence of international and local Afghan forces, poppy cultivation is not curtailed. It is a cause of concern for the region, especially so when 40% of the heroin enters into Pakistan, 35% in Iran and 25% into Central Asian countries.
- **according to a recent survey around one million people in Pakistan are using opium or heroine in the country.** It is estimated that around 160 metric tonnes of Afghan heroin is trafficked through Pakistan annually, out of which 138 metric tonnes are further trafficked to other countries, 19 metric tons consumed locally and only three metric tonnes are seized within the country. Afghan heroin has spread into Pakistan and
- **Besides opium, cannabis cultivation in Afghanistan also poses a threat to the region and the world as a whole.** The area under cannabis cultivation in





Afghanistan is estimated at 12,000 hectares, with 1,300 metric tonnes of hashish being produced in 2011. The total farm-gate value of cannabis resin production is estimated at USD 95 million. It is the world's most widely used illicit substance, with 119 to 224 million cannabis users worldwide.

The main conclusion was that **it is difficult to predict a decrease in illicit drug cultivation in Afghanistan and so the drug-related threat is not expected to decrease after 2014. Therefore, there is strong need to improve the efficiency of counter-narcotics efforts in Central Asia.**

The post-2014 scenarios for the evolution of situation in Afghanistan and surrounding countries lack clarity and predictability. Despite a decade of international stabilization efforts, Afghanistan's future remains uncertain. Elections in 2014 will be a key element in the transition process. Participants stressed that Afghans themselves carry the responsibility for the future development of their country.

Three possible scenarios of the post 2014 situation were discussed:

- **Optimistic scenario:** The present system in Afghanistan survives the transition and is strengthened by a peaceful power-sharing agreement. The State emerges from the 2014 elections and the withdrawal of international forces as a unified and centralized entity. Stability and security are maintained. This is the best-case scenario, which relies on a peaceful and smooth transfer of power following the elections and a strong sense of Afghan ownership over the internal political and security situation. This scenario, however, is unlikely to materialize.
- **Status quo/limbo scenario:** This option is more plausible and is simply a continuation of the situation as is today. The central authorities function as they do now but with decreased and conditioned support from the international community. For the wider region, this scenario would likely mean a transition toward a gloomier scenario rather than to the optimistic scenario above. North-south fragmentation in Afghanistan could lead the Central Asian states to embark upon isolationist policies toward Afghanistan, with only modest short-term involvement in economic projects, predominantly in northern Afghanistan in the border regions.
- **Pessimistic scenario:** This worst-case scenario envisages a division of Afghanistan either along a north-south line or shattering along ethno-linguistic-religious lines. Partition along a north-south line could unite non-Pashtun forces and unite the Central Asian countries in efforts to protect northern Afghanistan against the Taliban-dominated south. Fragmentation along ethno-linguistic-religious lines would destabilize and polarize not only the country but also the region. Different ethnic groups in Afghanistan would seek support from neighbouring countries populated by co-ethnics. In this way, conflicts between ethnic groups within Afghanistan could trigger

